The Kelner Doctrine of Foreign Policy

Sometimes I find Tim Hames' stuff in the Times uninspiring, but occasionally he writes something that I can't help but nod too and think, this guy "gets it". This morning was one such time where his commentary outlined a refreshingly honest and realistic view of the so-called legacy of "Iraq". What Time Hames argues is that those who bang on about Iraq

"dismiss the self-evident truth that any politician in Downing Street in 2003 would have done what Mr Blair opted to do." He goes on to say, and I quote in full rather than paraphrase.

"Why? Because for six decades the essence of our foreign policy has been to play Robin to the American Batman. This has been pursued by a succession of Labour and Conservative governments. It is a wholly rational stance because it maximises our international influence. Comparisons with the manner in which Harold Wilson avoided military commitment to the Vietnam War are otiose. Vietnam was a process, not an event. There was no starting gun at which the man in the White House could eyeball allies and implore Are you with me? This was the position that Mr Blair was in four years ago.

Not to have supported the United States in such a situation would have been seismic. It would have entailed a complete reversal of British foreign policy and a dash to become more deeply enmeshed in the EU. This would have necessitated, at a minimum, euro membership that British voters would rightly not have tolerated. It would also have meant trading down from the role of Robin to something akin to Shaggy in Scooby Doo in theory part of a gang in which the entire group is equal but where, invariably, it is either Fred (France) or Velma (Germany) who exercises the authority. The killer flaw in the all about Iraq argument is that it presumes that there was a serious choice.

Hames is of course totally right on this point, but he also takes on the criticism that, if we're going to take one dictator out why do we not take others out too. In fact, it is not uncommon to hear calls for intervention and then see the same people condemn us when we do. Kosovo is a case in point on this.

I can remember in the build up to that military engagement the Independent calling for some sort of action to avert a humanitarian crisis, however that coverage swiftly changed when we actually did something about it. Interestingly enough, Hames decides to single out the Independent's editor Simon Kelner saying,

"Furthermore, why shouldn't [Blair] think that removing odious dictators is worthwhile? It does not appear that much of a crime to me. Moral intervention has virtues. One notes that a number of those who attack Mr Blair for being involved in Afghanistan or Iraq are also urging that Britain becomes more entwined in Darfur, or Somalia, or Zimbabwe. Their logic results in what I will now name, in honour of the Editor of The Independent, the Kelner doctrine of foreign policy. This holds that while it might be fine to interfere in places that are of little or no strategic interest to the United Kingdom, it would be dreadful to do so in the Middle East, where our strategic interests are enormous. This is not a thesis that is destined to survive long in the harsh conditions of the real world.

I think that Hames point is correct here but he has missed something else. It is certainly true that those who follow the dominant meme of thinking today that can be described as the Kelner Doctrine do not just fail to understand the nature of strategic interests.

What they also do is shift goalposts when we do follow their calls for intervention. I've already mentioned Kosovo, however, I would be willing to bet that if Britain did decide to intervene in say Zimbabwe it would not be long after we did so that those who called for it would be condemning it as neo-imperial adventurism.

Thus the Kelner Doctrine (a phrase which I must say I think is superb) is not just simply an expression of UnRealism in foreign policy, but is also about shifting the goalposts in order to oppose whatever is being done at all costs.